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Abstract
The design of complex multi-agent systems is increasingly having to confront the possibility that
agents may not behave as they are supposed to. In addition to analysing the properties that hold
if protocols are followed correctly, it is also necessary to predict, test, and verify the properties
that would hold if these protocols were to be violated. We illustrate how the formal machinery of
deontic interpreted systems can be applied to the analysis of such problems by considering three
variations of the bit transmission problem. The first, an example in which an agent may fail to do
something it is supposed to do, shows how we deal with violations of protocols and specifications
generally. The second, an example in which an agent may do something it is not supposed to do,
shows how it is possible to specify and analyse remedial or error-recovery procedures. The third
combines both kinds of faults and introduces a new component into the system, a controller, whose
role is to enforce compliance with the protocol. In each case the formal analysis is used to test whether
critical properties of the system are compromised, in this example, the reliable communication of
information from one agent to the other.
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1. Introduction
The design of complex multi-agent systems is increasingly having to confront the pos-
sibility that agents may not behave as they are supposed to. In e-commerce, in security, in
automatic negotiation, in any application where agents are programmed by different parties
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with competing interests, it is unrealistic to assume that all agents will behave according
to some given protocol or standard of behaviour. In addition to analysing the properties
that hold if protocols are followed correctly, it is also necessary to predict, test, and ver-
ify the properties that would hold if these protocols were to be violated, and to test the
effectiveness of introducing proposed enforcement mechanisms.
Consider an online auction mechanism modelled and implemented as a multi-agent
system, where agents play the parts of auctioneers and bidders. At each round the protocol
of the system gives the opportunity to a selected number of agents to bid for some goods,
according to the specific auction protocol being employed. Suppose that an agent bids an
amount which it is unable to fulfil (either by mistake, or perhaps with the sole intention
of raising the bid so that an opponent will have to pay a higher price). If that bid is made
in the prescribed manner then it would still count as a valid bid—even if it were to be
regarded as illegal, anti-social, unethical to make a bid in those circumstances. Undesirable
behaviour of this kind will often have adverse effects on the system as a whole. Perhaps
the agent will be forced to de-commit from the commitment it entered upon by bidding, as
a result of which the seller will (at least temporarily) lose the deal, which in turn may have
consequences on other deals it has entered upon with other agents. At the very least, the
resulting disputes will have to be resolved at a cost.
One way out of such problems is to attempt to devise tighter controls in the protocols,
such as stipulating that a bid by an agent is valid only if made with previously cleared
funds. The opportunities for inventing such controls are limited, however, and in any case
have associated costs too (in the example, the costs of the clearing mechanism and the
consequently diminished liquidity of the market). Moreover forcing agents of an open
multi-agent system to behave according to a rigid set of rules is seen as increasingly unfea-
sible because of the inherent distribution of the system. One alternative, having specified
what is correct, desirable, or acceptable behaviour of the agents within a given context,
is to strive to handle and reason about violations of these norms within the system. The
required formalisms not only have to be capable of handling local violations, but must also
be capable of representing the usual attributes ascribed to agents in a multi-agent setting,
such as knowledge, intentions, and goals (see, e.g., [21]).
It is important to emphasise that the focus of the approach presented in this paper is
not on formalisms used internally by the agents as part of their reasoning mechanisms,
but rather for specification of properties of the system as a whole, ideally accompanied by
verification mechanisms. The question of how an agent may reason internally about the
norms that constrain its behaviour is an interesting one, but it is a different question that
will not be pursued in this paper. Note that it is legitimate and perfectly meaningful to
make this separation. Consider the familiar problem of controlling access to sensitive or
confidential data. There is a specification of what access is permitted or forbidden at the
system level but the agents who actually make the access need not be aware, and usually
are not aware, of what this specification is.
These are inherently complex issues, and we do not expect to have methods able to give
comprehensive answers to all of them in the near future. One approach being explored
by the authors as a step in this direction is an attempt to extend interpreted systems [4],
a mainstream and well-developed semantics for reasoning about knowledge in distributed
and multi-agent systems, with a deontic component. Deontic interpreted systems [14] are
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designed to represent correct and incorrect functioning behaviour of agents as well as their
epistemic properties.
While a considerable amount of theoretical work considers constructs not dissimilar to
those employed here (among others: [2,3,6,8,11,12,15,18]), we are not aware of any study
that puts these theoretical constructs to the test in an actual application. It is surprisingly
difficult to find concrete examples in the literature, let alone case studies showing how the
formal approaches may be applied in detail. Our aim in this paper is to advance the state-
of-the-art by constructing a fully worked out formal analysis of a concrete example, and to
illustrate and evaluate the formalism of deontic interpreted systems in the process.
Specifically, we show how the formalism of deontic interpreted systems [14] may
be applied to model and reason about protocol violations in a simple example, the bit-
transmission problem [10]. This is a much discussed scenario in distributed computing
involving two agents attempting to communicate the value of a bit over a faulty commu-
nication channel. Of course, the example is trivial compared to the kinds of applications
alluded to in this sections. Still, we argue that it is rich enough to raise many important
issues such as error correction and control/enforcement mechanisms, and in this sense is
representative. Furthermore, using a small, well understood, and widely discussed prob-
lem offers the possibility of testing rigorously a formal apparatus and investigating how it
performs in detail.
We will examine three variations of the bit-transmission problem. The first (Section 5) is
an example in which an agent may fail to do something it is supposed to do, and shows how
we deal with violations of protocols and specifications generally. The second (Section 6)
is an example in which an agent may do something it is not supposed to do, and shows
how it is possible to specify and analyse remedial or error-recovery procedures. The third
(Section 7) combines both kinds of faults and introduces a new component into the system,
a controller whose role is to enforce compliance with the protocol. In each case the formal
analysis is used to test whether critical properties of the system are compromised, in this
example, the reliable communication of information from one agent to the other.
2. Preliminaries
In this paper we use the machinery of interpreted systems as presented in [4], and the
extensions for modelling correct and incorrect functioning behaviours as developed in [14].
We present the main definitions here, but refer to the cited literature for more details.
Consider n non-empty sets L1, . . . ,Ln of local states, one for every agent of the sys-
tem, and a set of states for the environment LE . Elements of Li will be denoted by
l1, l′1, l2, l′2, . . . . Elements of LE will be denoted by lE, l′E, . . . .
Definition 1 (System of global states). A system of global states for n agents S is a non-
empty subset of a Cartesian product L1 × · · · × Ln ×LE .
An interpreted system of global states is a pair IS = (S, h) where S is a system of global
states and h :S → 2P is an interpretation function for a set of propositional variables P .
When g = (l1, . . . , ln, lE) is a global state of a system S , li (g) denotes the local state of
agent i in global state g. lE(g) denotes the local state of the environment in global state g.
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Systems of global states can be used to interpret epistemic modalities Ki , one for each
agent.
(IS, g) |= Kiϕ if for all g′we have that li(g) = li (g′) implies (IS, g′) |= ϕ.
Alternatively one can consider generated models (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n,h) of the standard rela-
tional (Kripke) kind, where the equivalence relations ∼i are defined on equivalence of local
states, i.e., g ∼i g′ iff li(g) = li (g′). Modalities are then interpreted on these models in the
usual way. The resulting logic for modalities Ki is of type S5n; this models agents with
complete introspection capabilities and veridical knowledge [9,17], though it is important
to see that the notion of knowledge modelled here is an information-theoretic one. An agent
‘knows’ ϕ when from an external perspective it has enough information to determine that
ϕ is true.
The notion of interpreted systems can be extended to incorporate the idea of correct
functioning behaviour of some or all of the components [14], as follows.
Definition 2 (Deontic system of global states). Given n agents and n + 1 non-empty sets
G1, . . . ,Gn,GE , a deontic system of global states is any system of global states defined
on L1 ⊇ G1, . . . ,Ln ⊇ Gn,LE ⊇ GE . For any agent i , Gi is called the set of green states
for agent i . GE is called the set of green states for the environment. The complement of
Gi with respect to Li (respectively GE with respect to LE ) is called the set of red states
for agent i (respectively for the environment).
The terms ‘green’ and ‘red’ are chosen as neutral terms, to avoid overloading them with
unintended readings and connotations. The term ‘green’ can be read as ‘legal’, ‘accept-
able’, ‘desirable’, ‘correct’, depending on the context of a given application.
Note that global states can also be classified as green/red. Let Gi denote the set of global
states in which agent i is in a green local state: g ∈ Gi iff li (g) ∈ Gi .
Deontic systems of global states are used to interpret modalities such as the following
(IS, g) |= Oiϕ if for all g′ we have that li (g′) ∈ Gi implies (IS, g′) |= ϕ
(or equivalently: if for all g′ ∈ Gi we have (IS, g′) |= ϕ).
Oiϕ is used to represent that ϕ holds in all (global) states in which agent i is
functioning correctly. Again, one can consider generated models of the standard form
(S,∼1, . . . ,∼n,RO1 , . . . ,ROn ,h) where the equivalence relations ∼i are defined as above
and the relations ROi are defined by gR
O
i g
′ if li (g′) ∈ Gi . In particular, the semantics of
Oi is essentially that of an obligation operator in (a strengthened form of) standard deontic
logic: each Oi is a normal modality of type KD45; the multi-modal case can be axiomatised
by the system KD45i−j [14]. However, it would not be appropriate to read the expression
Oiϕ as ‘there is an obligation on agent i that ϕ’.
Knowledge can be modelled on deontic interpreted systems in the same way as on inter-
preted systems, and one can study various combinations of the modalities such as KiOj ,
OjKi , and others. It is particularly important when reading these expressions, however,
to remember that they express the external “bird’s eye” view of the system: OjKiϕ says
that in all states of the system in which agent j is functioning correctly, from an external
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perspective agent i has sufficient information to know that ϕ. There are many other senses
of ‘ought to know’ that are not captured by this construction.
Another concept of particular interest is knowledge that an agent i has on the assumption
that the system (the environment, agent j , group of agents X) is functioning correctly. We
employ the (doubly relativised) modal operator K̂ji for this notion, interpreted as follows:
(IS, g) |= K̂ji ϕ if for all g′ such that li(g) = li (g′) and lj (g′) ∈ Gj
we have that (IS, g′) |= ϕ.
Ki , Oi , and K̂ji are all normal modalities (of type S5, KD45, and KD45, respectively).
Various relationships hold between them, such as Kiϕ → K̂ji ϕ, KiOjϕ → K̂ji ϕ, Ojϕ →
K̂
j
i ϕ, and others. Further details, and metalogical properties such as frame correspondence
and completeness, may be found in [14]. Our aim in this present paper is to illustrate the
use of these modalities in the examples to follow.
Finally, interpreted systems can be extended to deal with temporal evolution. Consider
a set of runs over global states R = {r: NS}, representing flows of time for the system.
When this structure is in place one can interpret the usual temporal connectives on it (see,
e.g., [7]). In this paper we limit our analysis to the static case.
3. The bit transmission problem
The bit-transmission problem [4] involves two agents, a sender S, and a receiver R,
communicating over a possibly faulty communication channel. S wants to communicate
some information—the value of a bit for the sake of the example—to R. We would like to
design a protocol that accomplishes this objective while minimising the use of the commu-
nication channel.
Two (trivial) special cases of the scenario can immediately be solved. The first is the one
in which the channel is actually working, or is at least operative for the first few rounds of
computation. In this case we would require S to send the value of the bit once as the system
comes alive. The other special case arises when the channel is constantly non-operative.
There is obviously no protocol that can ensure that R receives the information in that case.
The interesting scenario arises when the channel is working correctly at certain times
while failing at others. There are several ways in which this can be approached, for in-
stance by stipulating that the channel delivers messages with a fixed probability P > 0
at any given round. In this paper we do not make any of these assumptions; instead, we
analyse the most general case with respect to a most simple protocol. The protocol is as
follows. S immediately starts sending the bit to R, and continues to do so until it receives
an acknowledgement from R. R does nothing until it receives the bit; from then on it sends
acknowledgements of receipt to S. S stops sending the bit to R when it receives an ac-
knowledgement. Note that R will continue sending acknowledgements even after S has
received its acknowledgement. Intuitively S will know for sure that the bit has been re-
ceived by R when it gets an acknowledgement from R. R, on the other hand, will never be
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able to know whether its acknowledgement has been received since S does not answer the
acknowledgement.1 We refer to [4,10] for further discussion.
4. Analysis
The bit-transmission problem can be analysed using the formalism of interpreted sys-
tems. To do this we follow the approach taken by Halpern and colleagues in [4].
There are three active components in the scenario: a sender, a receiver, and a com-
munication channel. In line with the spirit of the formalism of interpreted systems, it is
convenient to see sender and receiver as agents, and the communication channel as the
environment. Each of these can be modelled by considering their local states. For the
sender S, it is enough to consider four possible local states. They represent the value of
the bit that S is attempting to transmit, and whether or not S has received an acknowledge-
ment from R. Three different local states are enough to capture the state of R: the value
of the received bit, if any, and the circumstance in which no bit has been received yet,
represented by . So we have
LS = {0, 1,0-ack,1-ack}, LR = {0, 1, }.
To model the environment it is often convenient to represent in the local state (amongst
other things) the combinations of messages that were sent in the previous round, by S
and R, respectively. The four local states would then be:
LE =
{
(. , .), (sendbit, .), (. , sendack), (sendbit, sendack)
}
,
where ‘.’ represents configurations in which no message was sent by the corresponding
agent. However, for the examples we will be analysing in this paper this level of detail is
unnecessary, and so for simplicity we shall take the local states of the environment to be
just a singleton:
LE = {·}.
This is to simplify (and shorten) the presentation. It should be obvious how the formulas
of later sections can be adjusted for examples requiring a more complicated representation
of the environment’s local states.
Global states S for the system are defined as S ⊆ LS × LR × LE . A global state g =
(lS, lR, lE) gives a snapshot of the system at a given time. Note that not all triples of the
product are admissible in principle, but only those that can be reached in a run of the
protocol from given initial configurations, as will be explained below. Although in this
simple example the LE component is fixed, it is not redundant, and we will retain it in
the global states as a reminder that reference to it would be required in more complicated
settings.
1 One might think that this problem can be solved by insisting that S sends an acknowledgement of the
acknowledgement, but by doing so we simply push the problem one level deeper, and S would never know
whether its acknowledgement of the acknowledgement has been received by R.
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The interpreted systems framework has the advantage of being suitable for integration
with finer semantics representing actions and protocols. To do so consider a set of actions
Acti for every agent in the system and the environment. The actions for the agents S and
R are as follows:
ActS = {sendbit, λ}, ActR = {sendack, λ}.
Here λ stands for no action (‘no-op’).
The actions ActE for the environment correspond to the transmission of messages be-
tween S and R on the unreliable communication channel. To make the example sufficiently
rich, we will assume that the communication channel can transmit messages in both direc-
tions simultaneously, and that a message travelling in one direction can get through while
a message travelling in the opposite direction is lost. (Alternatively, think of a pair of uni-
directional communication channels whose faults are independent of one other.) The set of
actions for the environment is
ActE = {↔,→,←,−}.
↔ represents the action in which the channel transmits any message successfully in both
directions, → that it transmits successfully from S to R but loses any message from R
to S, ← that it transmits successfully from R to S but loses any message from S to R,
and − that it loses any messages sent in either direction. Alternatively, we could model
the communications channel by having a single action for the environment, transmit, and
then representing the unreliability of the channel by four possible local states of the envi-
ronment. It comes to much the same thing, except that this alternative treatment makes the
specification of the rest of the system slightly more cumbersome.
We can model the evolution of the system by means of a transition function π :S ×
Act → 2S , where Act = ActS × ActR × ActE is the set of joint actions for the system:
π(g, (αS,αR,αE)) is the set of global states resulting (non-deterministically) from perfor-
mance in global state g of actions αS , αR , αE by sender S, receiver R, and the environment,
respectively. The function π codes the fact that the state of the communication channel de-
termines whether the actions performed by the agents (i.e., the messages they send on the
channel) get through or not, and what their effects are. For example, the definition of π
contains the following:2
π
(
(0, , ·), (sendbit, λ,↔))= (0,0, ·),
π
(
(0, , ·), (sendbit, λ,→)) = (0,0, ·),
π
(
(0, , ·), (sendbit, λ,←)) = (0, , ·),
π
(
(0, , ·), (sendbit, λ,−))= (0, , ·),
to capture that when the channel works properly the message sendbit from S gets through
and gets processed accordingly by R.
2 We omit brackets when writing singleton sets to reduce clutter.
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sλ, λs and ss stand for the joint actions (sendbit, λ), (λ, sendack) and (sendbit, sendack), respectively. Actions
of the environment ActE are omitted for simplicity.
Some other cases are as follows:
π
(
(0,0, ·), (sendbit, sendack, αE)
)= (0-ack,0, ·) (αE ∈ {←,↔}),
π
(
(0,0, ·), (sendbit, sendack, αE)
)= (0,0, ·) (αE ∈ {→,−}).
The remaining cases can be similarly expressed and are added straightforwardly. We leave
the details to the reader. The transition function π is depicted, in simplified form, in Fig. 1.
For compliance with a given protocol, only certain actions are performable at a given
time for an agent. For example if sender S has not yet received an acknowledgement from
receiver R, i.e., in the model, when S is in the local state 0 or 1, then according to the
simple protocol under consideration, S should send the value of the bit over the channel
to R, i.e., perform the action sendbit. To capture such requirements the concept of protocol
can be used. A protocol for agent i is a function Pi :Li → 2Acti mapping local states to
sets of actions. Pi(li ) is the set of actions performable according to the protocol by agent i
when its local state is li . For the example under consideration the protocol can be defined
as follows:
PS(0) = PS(1) = sendbit, PS(0-ack) = PS(1-ack) = λ,
PR() = λ, PR(0) = PR(1) = sendack.
(As usual, singleton sets are written here without brackets.) For the environment, for this
simple example, we use the constant function:
PE(lE) = ActE = {↔,→,←,−}, for all lE ∈ LE.
If we assume that the system starts from an initial state (0, , ·) or (1, , ·), it is pos-
sible to show that S will start sending the bit and will only stop after having received an
acknowledgement from R. In turn R will remain silent until it receives the bit, and it will
never stop sending acknowledgements from then on. The analysis can be made formally by
using the mechanism of contexts [5] and implemented in model checking languages such
as in [13]; for our purposes it is not necessary to pursue that analysis here.
Definition 3 (Run, reachable global state, Pi -compliant run). Let S be a set of global
states, π : S × Act → 2S a transition function, Pi a protocol function for the agent i , and
I a set of initial configurations I ⊆ S . A run is any sequence
g0γ1g1 . . . gk−1γkgk . . . gn−1γngn (n 0),
where g0 ∈ I , each γk (k = 1 . . .n) is a joint action in Act, and gk ∈ π(gk−1, γk). A global
state g is π -reachable if g = gn for some run g0γ1g1 . . . gn−1γngn.
Let [γ ]i denote the action performed by agent i in global transition γ , i.e., when γ =
(α1, . . . , αn,αE), [γ ]i = αi .
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temically equivalent for S (respectively for R). The environment component is omitted for simplicity.
A run g0γ1g1 . . . gn−1γngn is Pi -compliant when [γk]i ∈ Pi(li(gk−1)) for each k =
1 . . .n. A global state g is Pi -reachable if g = gn for some Pi -compliant run g0γ1g1 . . .
gn−1γngn.
The set of global states reachable from the initial configurations (0, , ·) and (1, , ·) as
defined by the transition function π and the protocol functions PS , PR and PE , is sum-
marised in Fig. 2. The environment component is omitted for clarity.
Having defined the set of reachable global states, we can apply the tools of formal logic
to the analysis of the scenario by considering an interpretation of a suitably chosen set
of propositional variables. We shall use the set P = {bit = 0,bit = 1, recbit, recack}. We
interpret these on the interpreted system ISb = (Sπ ,∼S,∼R,h), where Sπ is the set of
reachable global states as defined by π and the protocol functions PS , PR and PE , where
∼R and ∼S are equivalence relations on global states as defined in Section 2, and where h
is an interpretation for the atoms in P such that the following holds:
(ISb, g) |= bit = 0 if lS(g) = 0, or lS(g) = 0-ack,
(ISb, g) |= bit = 1 if lS(g) = 1, or lS(g) = 1-ack,
(ISb, g) |= recbit if lR(g) = 1, or lR(g) = 0,
(ISb, g) |= recack if lS(g) = 1-ack, or lS(g) = 0-ack.
This permits us to represent and check properties of the system directly on the se-
mantical models. For example, by employing standard temporal connectives on the runs
constructed above one can check that:
ISb 
|= recbit → AF recack
which represents the intrinsic unreliability of the channel (AF here means truth in some
global state in all future branching runs).
Irrespective of the analysis of the dynamic properties of the system, there is one in-
teresting static epistemic property that is worth observing. By ascribing knowledge to the
agents using the standard [4] approach (see Section 2), it can be checked from Fig. 2 that
(1)ISb |= recbit →
(
KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)
)
which confirms our intuition about the model. Furthermore:
(2)ISb |= recack → recbit,
(3)ISb |= recack →
(
KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)
)
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and perhaps most interestingly that(4)ISb |= recack → KS
(
KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)
)
,
(5)ISb |= recack ∧ (bit = 0) → KSKR(bit = 0)
(and similarly for the case (bit = 1)). So, if an ack is received by S, then S is sure that
R knows the value of the bit. Intuitively this represents the fact that although the channel
is potentially faulty, if messages do manage to travel back and forth the protocol is strong
enough to eliminate any uncertainty in the communication. Whereas, for example,
ISb 
|= recack ∧ (bit = 0) → KRKSKR(bit = 0).
The properties (1)–(5) above can be checked by direct calculation on the table in Fig. 2.
Properties (3), (4) and (5) can also be derived very straightforwardly from (1) and (2) in
the logic S5n. (3) follows from (1) and (2) by propositional logic. (4) follows from (3) and
the property, easy to check from Fig. 2, that ISb |= recack → KSrecack: indeed, suppose
ISb |= recbit → ϕ for any formula ϕ. Then ISb |= recack → ϕ by propositional logic from
(2), and furthermore, since KS is normal, we have both ISb |= KS(recack → ϕ) and ISb |=
KSrecack → KSϕ. With ISb |= recack → KSrecack, the property ISb |= recack → KSϕ
follows immediately. Property (4) is a special case. Property (5) can be derived in similar
fashion. Again, the form of these derivations surely accords with our intuition about the
example. The derivations will be useful, moreover, when we examine more complicated
examples later.
It may be felt that the above is an unnecessarily complicated formalisation of such a
simple example. Indeed, it is possible to construct much simpler formalisations that will
still support the analysis conducted above. For example, instead of having four different
actions for the environment, the unreliability of the communications channel can be mod-
elled simply by non-determinism of the transition function π . In this simplified model, the
component for the environment action is redundant (it is always ‘transmit’), and so the
simplified transition function is defined as follows:
π
(
(0, , ·), (sendbit, λ))= {(0, , ·), (0,0, ·)},
π
(
(0,0, ·), (sendbit, sendack))= {(0,0, ·), (0-ack,0, ·)},
π
(
(0-ack,0, ·), (λ, sendack))= {(0-ack,0, ·)}.
It is easy to check that this simplified formalisation (with the same protocol functions as
before) generates exactly the same space of reachable global states as shown in Fig. 2, and
so produces the same analysis of the example also. The more complicated formalisation,
however, with four explicit transmission actions for the environment and a correspondingly
more complicated definition of the transition function π , will be necessary when we con-
sider a more complicated variant of the bit-transmission problem in Section 7 where an
additional controller agent is introduced to monitor the messages that pass along the com-
munication channel. It is for this reason that we show the more complicated formalisation
in this and subsequent sections.
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5. Violation of specificationsIn the previous section we have assumed that both agents and environment follow their
respective protocols. We now apply the machinery of deontic interpreted systems [14] to
analyse what happens when the specified protocols are violated in the bit-transmission
problem. We examine in detail only the possibility that R is faulty. The possibility that S
is faulty, and other combinations of faulty R, S and E, can be treated in similar fashion.
Specifically, we shall consider in this section the possibility that R may send acknowl-
edgements without having received the bit. This is a simple example of an agent doing
something that it should not do. In the section that follows we shall consider an example
where an agent does not do something that it should do.
In order to apply the machinery we modify the framework of the previous section so
that the set of local states of agent i is composed of two disjoint sets of green (Gi ) and red
(Ri ) local states, representing correct and incorrect functioning behaviour respectively. For
the sender S, since we are not admitting (for the purposes of the example) the possibility
of faults, its local states are all green, that is to say, allowed by the protocol. We thus have:
LS = GS = {0,1,0-ack,1-ack}, RS = ∅.
For the case of the environment, we have admitted the possibility of faulty, or unreliable,
behaviour but these ‘faults’ are not violations of the protocol under examination, and are
not therefore regarded as ‘red’ states. Accordingly, all local states of the environment are
also green, and we have:
LE = GE, RE = ∅.
It remains to model the local states of the, now potentially faulty, receiver R. We can do
so by extending the set of local states {0,1, } with at least one additional element, -ack
representing the (red) local state in which R has sent an acknowledgement without having
received the value of the bit. This is a reasonable model if we assume that receiver R has
at least some rudimentary recall or memory capability that allows its local state to record
whether a sendack message has been sent (not necessarily successfully). In that case, it is
also reasonable to extend the set of R’s local states to include elements 0-ack and 1-ack
as well. It remains to determine whether these two elements should be classified as red or
green local states of R. We will discuss that presently. In summary, the local states of R
for this version of the problem are defined as follows:
L′R = {0,1, ,0-ack,1-ack, -ack}
with {0,1, } ⊆ G′R , {-ack} ⊆ R′R , and states 0-ack and 1-ack still to be classified into G′R
or R′R .
How we classify these two remaining local states of R depends on how we choose to
interpret the ack component. One possibility is to view the ack as indicating that at least
one faulty acknowledgement was sent at some time before the value of the bit had been
received. On this reading, the local states 0-ack and 1-ack would both be classified as red
local states for R.
In this paper, however, we will do it differently, and in a more general way. Here, we
will interpret the ack in local states 0-ack and 1-ack for R as indicating merely that a
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sendack action has been performed by R—ack in these states does not signify that this
acknowledgement was a faulty one, just that at least one acknowledgement has been sent.
We will let the protocol function P ′R for this extended system determine whether local
states for R are green or red. Specifically, we will say that a local state lR for receiver
R is ‘green’ (belongs to G′R) iff there is a P ′R-reachable global state (lS, lR, lE), i.e., by
Definition 3, iff (lS, lR, lE) is the final global state of some P ′R -compliant run of the system
starting at one of the initial states (0, ) or (1, ). The green local states G′R for R will
thus represent those local states of R that could have been reached in a run in which R
behaved according to its protocol at each step; this is the appropriate notion of ‘green’ for
the analysis we want to conduct. The red local states R′R are those local states of R which
could only be reached by incorrect functioning behaviour by R.
We turn now to defining the protocol functions P ′R , P ′S , P ′E , and the transition func-
tion π ′, of the deontic interpreted system for this version of the problem. Since the two
sets of local states for S and E have not changed we can keep the function PS and PE
described in Section 4, i.e., we take P ′S = PS and P ′E = PE . But we need to extend the
protocol function PR of Section 4 so that P ′R is defined also on the local states L′R of R
that were not in LR . We want to define what we might call a ‘conservative’ extension of
the protocol function PR : the protocol P ′R should be the same as PR when evaluated on
the local states LR , leaving it only to define its values for the new local states L′R \ LR .
The projection of the new interpreted system onto the green local states should result in the
‘old’ system ISb of Section 4. So we have:
P ′R() = PR() = λ, P ′R(0) = P ′R(1) = PR(0) = PR(1) = sendack.
How shall we define P ′R for the new local states, and in particular for the (red) local state
-ack? Of course, the protocol described in Section 3 does not say: as presented, it does not
cover the possibility of violation, and does not specify what actions are to be taken if errors
(here, the sending of premature acknowledgements) arise. For the sake of concreteness, let
us define
P ′R(0-ack) = P ′R(1-ack) = sendack, P ′R(-ack) = λ.
In fact, in this example, it makes little difference how we define P ′R for these new local
states. As is perhaps obvious, there is no extension of the bit-transmission protocol that
will recover effectively from the erroneous sending of an acknowledgement by R. The
point, however, is that in general it is meaningful to define protocols on red states as well
as green, whenever the protocol makes provision for remedial or error recovery actions.
The question that we would now like to ask is how the runs of the system change fol-
lowing the introduction of the new local states for R. Suppose the system starts as before
from the global state g0 = (0, , ·) or g0 = (1, , ·). It can either produce an error-free run
or R can act faultily at any time during the evolution. Notice first that R’s faults may in-
deed inhibit the communication of the bit. For example, if at any point R sends an ack
without having received the bit, this, if received by S, will make S stop sending messages,
preventing any communication between the agents. This simple observation indicates that
some of the properties that hold in the case of no incorrect behaviour will no longer be
valid here. This should be reflected in the analysis.
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Let us explore then how the analysis turns out by applying the same multi-modal lan-
guage based on the set of atoms P = {bit = 0,bit = 1, recbit, recack}, and augmented
by the modal operators Oi,Ki, K̂ji described in Section 2. We interpret formulas on the
deontic interpreted system
IS′b =
(S ′π ,∼′R,∼′S,ROR ′,ROS ′, h′
)
resulting from defining the relations ∼′S , ∼′R , ROS ′ on the set of the π ′-reachable global
states S ′π ⊂ LS × L′R × LE , and with the relation ROR
′ defined by taking the green local
states for R to be those in any P ′R-reachable global state.
For the computation of reachable global states S ′π , it remains to define the transition
function π ′ for system IS′b, by extending the definition of π in system ISb. First, we specify
the effects of protocol-violating actions in the states Sπ the original system ISb. For the
case where the bit is 0 (the other can be done similarly) we shall impose:
π ′
(
(0, , ·), (sendbit, sendack,↔))= (0-ack,0-ack, ·),
π ′
(
(0, , ·), (sendbit, sendack,→))= (0,0-ack, ·),
π ′
(
(0, , ·), (sendbit, sendack,←))= (0-ack, -ack, ·),
π ′
(
(0, , ·), (sendbit, sendack,−))= (0, -ack, ·).
These definitions can be expressed more concisely in various ways3 but we present them
in this long-winded style for ease of reading. Note that in the second and fourth cases the
result state is a faulty (red) state even though the erroneous acknowledgement sent by R
was not received by S.
Now we extend the definition of π so that π ′ is defined also on the new states corre-
sponding to the new local states L′R − LR .
π ′
(
(0, -ack), ·), (sendbit, sendack,↔))= (0-ack,0-ack, ·),
π ′
(
(0, -ack), ·), (sendbit, sendack,→))= (0,0-ack, ·),
π ′
(
(0, -ack), ·), (sendbit, sendack,←))= (0-ack, -ack, ·),
π ′
(
(0, -ack), ·), (sendbit, sendack,−))= (0, -ack, ·).
Similarly, for further illustration:
π ′
(
(0,0-ack), ·), (sendbit, sendack, αE)
)= (l′S, l′R, ·),
where l′S = 0-ack, l′R = 0-ack for αE = ↔ or αE = ←; and l′S = 0, l′R = 0-ack for αE = →
or αE = −.
The remaining cases are expressed similarly and are left to the reader. For the rest of
the system we define π ′ to behave in the same way as π in ISb, i.e., the projection of π ′
3 In practice we formulate the definition of a transition function either as a (small) Prolog program or by means
of model checking languages such as SMV, and then use those to generate the sets of reachable global states shown
in figures in this paper. Once again, a much simpler formalisation of the example can be obtained by modelling the
unreliability of the communication channel by non-determinism of the transition function π ′ instead of dealing
explicitly with the four different kinds of environment actions. We will need the more complicated version when
we consider the variant of the example in Section 7.
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ments. The case bit = 1 is similar and is omitted. Labels sλ, λs and ss stand for the joint actions (sendbit, λ),
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∗
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Fig. 4. The state space of the bit-transmission system in case R may send incorrect acknowledgements. Columns
(respectively rows) represent global states epistemically equivalent for S (respectively for R). The shaded entries
indicate the states that are not P ′R -reachable.
onto the components of S and E coincides with π . The transition function π ′ is depicted,
in simplified form, in Fig. 3.
Given these definitions we can compute the set of π ′-reachable states as before, and
then pick out the set of P ′R-reachable states (the green states for R) by identifying the P ′R-
compliant runs. The state space for this version of the problem is shown in Fig. 4, again
omitting the environment component for clarity.
The interpretation h′ for the new system is the interpretation h from the previous section
with the interpretation of recbit updated, thus:
(IS′b, g) |= recbit if lR(g) = 1, or lR(g) = 0, or
lR(g) = 0-ack, or lR(g) = 1-ack.
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We can now investigate whether or not the formulas that held true in the scenario with
no fault remain true here. It is easily checked that
(6)IS′b |= recbit →
(
KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)
)
which confirms our intuition about the model. Even if faults occur, if the bit has been
received, R will know its value. It is the mechanism of acknowledgements that is no longer
reliable. Indeed we find in our model that:
IS′b 
|= recack → recbit,
IS′b 
|= recack →
(
KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)
)
,
and as expected:
IS′b 
|= recack → KS
(
KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)
)
,
IS′b 
|= recack ∧ (bit = 0) → KSKR(bit = 0).
Notice however that using the operator OR introduced in Section 2, which represents what
holds in states where R is operating correctly, we have the following:
(7)IS′b |= OR(recack → recbit),
(8)IS′b |= OR
(
recack → (KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1))).
More interesting is that a particular form of knowledge also still holds. Intuitively if S
makes the assumption of R’s correct functioning behaviour, then, upon receipt of an ac-
knowledgement, it would make sense for it to assume that R does know the value of the
bit. To model this intuition we use the operator K̂ji “knowledge under the assumption of
correct behaviour” as presented in Section 2. This describes the knowledge agent i has
if attention is restricted to states in which j is performing as intended. We refer to [14]
for more details, but note that unlike the usual epistemic operators associated with inter-
preted systems, K̂ji is not an S5 operator, and in particular it does not have axiom T, i.e.,
knowledge under assumptions of correct functioning behaviour does not imply truth. This
operator is of particular interest here because it captures precisely our intuition about the
example. We have:
(9)IS′b |= recack → K̂RS
(
KR(bit = 0)∨ KR(bit = 1)
)
,
(10)IS′b |= recack ∧ (bit = 0) → K̂RS KR(bit = 0).
Again, as in Section 4, we can check these properties by calculation from the table in
Fig. 4, and we can derive them syntactically from properties simpler to evaluate. Check first
from Fig. 4 that properties (6) and (7) hold. These are the key properties. From (6) and (7),
and OR normal, we easily derive (8). To derive (9) and (10) we modify the argument used
in Section 4 allowing now for the presence of OR . Suppose that the following generalised
form of property (8) is valid in the model: IS′b |= OR(recack → ϕ). Since KS is normal,
we get IS′b |= KSOR(recack → ϕ). The general property KSORϕ → K̂RS ϕ is valid in the
class of all deontic interpreted systems (see the summary of the logic in Section 2 and [14]
for details), so we have IS′b |= K̂RS (recack → ϕ), and hence also IS′b |= K̂RS recack → K̂RS ϕ
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because K̂R is normal. Now IS′ |= recack → KSrecack still holds, as is easily checkedS b
from Fig. 4, and the general property KSϕ → K̂RS ϕ of the logic (see Section 2) gives
IS′b |= recack → K̂RS recack. So we get IS′b |= recack → K̂RS ϕ, of which (9) is a special
case. The derivation of property (10) can be obtained in similar fashion.
To summarise: we have modified the scenario of the bit-transmission problem, relaxing
slightly the assumptions of correct functioning behaviour that hold true for it. In particular,
we have allowed for the possibility that one of the agents, the receiver R, may violate the
protocol by performing an action it should not perform according to the protocol. We have
seen that some key properties of the system then no longer hold. In particular under the
assumptions we have studied, S will never know whether or not R knows the value of the
bit; at best S can know this only under the assumption of correct functioning behaviour
for R.4 This is an intuitive result that was validated semantically on the model, and derived
syntactically from some simple key properties of the model.
In specifying the extended protocol, a value of P ′R for the new local states of R had to
be chosen. It seems intuitively obvious that no specification of P ′R for these states would
allow us to recover the key property we require of the protocol. In other words, it should be
possible to show that recack ∧ (bit = 0) → KSKR(bit = 0) is not valid in IS′b no matter
how we extend the definition of PR to cover the new local states of R—there is no protocol
that will ensure recovery of communication once a violation has occurred.
How could the system recover after R has sent an incorrect ack? It seems as though the
only way to proceed is for the two agents to re-synchronise, perhaps with a message from
R signalling the failure of all communication so far with a request to restart the protocol
from scratch. Clearly this request could per se fail to reach S, so we would need to require
S to acknowledge the request to R. So the roles of S and R would need to be swapped
before communication can be resumed. We see no conceptual difficulty in modelling this
setting with the tools presented so far.
6. An error-correcting protocol
Consider again the bit-transmission problem as modelled in Section 4, but assume now
that R can be faulty in a different way, in that it may fail to send acknowledgements when
in fact it has received the bit. To what extent would this second kind of fault compromise
communication, and are there ways of recovering from it? In line with the development of
the previous section, let us define the elements of the model for this new setting: sets local
states, protocols, the transition function, reachable global states, and the classification of
states into green (protocol-compliant) and red.
4 In the case where the communication channel operates symmetrically in both directions, i.e., in the case
where either the channel loses messages in both directions or both messages get through, the sender S knows
that receiver R knows the value of the bit when S receives an acknowledgement, even without assuming correct
behaviour by R. This is because if S receives an acknowledgement, its transmission of the bit must also have got
through to R. The reader may care to re-work the analysis for the simpler case where ActE = {↔,−} to check
that the formal model confirms this informal argument.
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The set of local red and green states for S and E are the same as in the models of
Sections 4 and 5. The local states for R are as follows:
L′′R = {0,1, ,0-f,1-f }, G′′R ⊇ {0,1, }.
Here f is intended to indicate that the bit has been received but R has failed (at least once)
to send an acknowledgement. It seems obvious that the red local states for R are then
{0-f,1-f } but for the sake of following a general method we will let the protocol function
and the transition function pick these out when we compute the protocol-compliant runs.
The protocol functions we use for S and E are again the ones we employed in Sections 4
and 5; what changes is the protocol function for agent R. Again, we wish to define an
extension P ′′R of PR that has the same values as PR for the original (green) local states LR
and specifies in addition how R should behave when in one of the new (red) local states
L′′R − LR . The transition function π ′′ will specify the results of actions by R in these new
states and of protocol-violating actions by R in the original (green) local states LR . In this
example, unlike the one of Section 5, there is an obvious way of extending the protocol
so that we obtain error-correcting behaviour in case a fault has occurred: if R has failed to
send an acknowledgement, we simply require that R does so at the next round. Formally:
P ′′R() = λ, P ′′R(0) = P ′′R(1) = sendack, P ′′R(0-f ) = P ′′R(1-f ) = sendack.
So in this case, it is easy to spell out the conditions for recovery from a red state. To check
that recovery is indeed obtained we evaluate formulas on the evolution of the deontic in-
terpreted system just constructed. It remains to define the transition function of the system,
so that we can compute the set of reachable global states.
As usual, we extend the definition of π for the original model, by considering first the
conditions under which we move to one of the new local states for agent R (i.e., one of the
states L′′R − LR), and then the outcome of transitions originating from these local states.
For all αE ∈ ActE , unless stated otherwise:
π ′′
(
(0,0, ·), (sendbit, λ,αE)
)= (0,0-f, ·),
π ′′
(
(0-ack,0, ·), (λ,λ,αE)
)= (0-ack,0-f, ·),
π ′′
(
(0,0-f, ·), (sendbit, λ,αE)
)= (0,0-f, ·),
π ′′
(
(0,0-f, ·), (sendbit, sendack, αE)
)= (0-ack,0-f, ·), (αE ∈ {↔,←})
π ′′
(
(0,0-f, ·), (sendbit, sendack, αE)
)= (0,0-f, ·), (αE ∈ {→,−}).
The definitions for bit = 1 are analogous. For completeness, the remaining cases are:
π ′′
(
(0-ack,0-f, ·), (λ,λ,αE)
)= (0-ack,0-f, ·),
π ′′
(
(0-ack,0-f, ·), (λ, sendack, αE)
)= (0-ack,0-f, ·).
With this information, we can compute the set of π ′′-reachable global states and pick
out from them the P ′′R-reachable ones. Once again we do not show the entire computation
here, but simply summarise the results in Fig. 5, with the environment component omitted
as usual.
Following what is by now our standard procedure we can determine the corresponding
deontic interpreted system IS′′b and interpret the formulas of interest. The interpretation
110 A. Lomuscio, M. Sergot / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 93–116Fig. 5. The state space of the bit-transmission system in case R may fail to send acknowledgements when sup-
posed to do so. Columns (respectively rows) represent global states epistemically equivalent for S (respectively
for R). The shaded entries indicate the states that are not P ′′
R
-reachable.
function h′′ for atoms is as before, adjusted to cover the newly introduced global states: h′′
is h with the obvious extension to make atom recbit true also in all global states g with
lR(g) = 0-f or lR(g) = 1-f . It is easily confirmed that we have all of:
IS′′b |= recack →
(
KR(bit = 0)∨ KR(bit = 1)
)
,
IS′′b |= recack → KS
(
KR(bit = 0)∨KR(bit = 1)
)
,
IS′′b |= recack ∧ (bit = 0) → KSKR(bit = 0).
Indeed, these follow immediately by checking in Fig. 5 that
IS′′b |= recbit →
(
KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)
)
,
IS′′b |= recack → recbit.
The rest then follows by the same syntactic derivation as in Section 4.
Naturally, assuming correctness of R’s behaviour does not invalidate any of the above,
so that we have also, e.g.:
IS′′b |= recack ∧ (bit = 0) → K̂RS KR(bit = 0).
Indeed, KSϕ → K̂RS ϕ is valid in the class of all deontic interpreted systems: Kiϕ → K̂ji ϕ
is a property of the logic for all pairs of agents i and j (see [14] for details).
This example demonstrates how the formalism of deontic interpreted systems deals with
two rather intuitive points. First, not all incorrect behaviours by the participating agents
necessarily compromise the validity of crucial properties of the system being modelled.
Secondly, it is possible and useful to reason about these incorrect error states and devise
protocols that attempt recovery from them.
7. Control
In the previous section it was possible to devise a simple error-correcting protocol that,
if followed, ensures that the system will get back to a state in which all the agents are in
a green local state. This is not always possible, of course. Given a system in which agents
cannot be assumed to behave in accordance with the specified standards of behaviour or
to follow the prescribed protocols, it is natural to seek additional control or enforcement
mechanisms that can be introduced to encourage or even force agents to comply. Of these
the simplest (but by no means the only) strategy is to look for a way of constraining the
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agents’ behaviour so that the possibility of violation is simply eliminated. In the present ex-
ample, for instance, we could add an additional filter on the transmission of messages from
R to block out those that would cause violations of the protocol. If successful, we would
have an example of an enforcement strategy called ‘regimentation’ in [11]. Discussion of
other possible strategies is beyond the scope of this paper.
So let us consider another variation of the bit-transmission problem. This time we will
assume that R may develop faults of either of the two kinds analysed in Sections 5 and 6.
We also introduce a third agent C into the system, a controller whose function is to con-
strain the behaviour of R. The controller agent C is a kind of ‘regimentation’ device. As
we understand it, it is a (simple) example of what is called an ‘inter-agent’ in [20] and a
‘controller’ in [19].
C’s actions are the following:
ActC = {allow,block}.
These actions provide an additional filter on the attempted actions of receiver R. The block
action will be used to override any transmit action of the environment when R attempts to
send an erroneous acknowledgement; allow allows a message from R to enter the trans-
mission channel to S.
The controller C must be able to detect violations of the protocol by R. However, it is
a fundamental assumption of the formalism of interpreted systems that all local states are
private and only actions are public. This is to model what actually happens in distributed
and multi-agent systems. The local state of an agent i is invisible to a different agent j ,
unless there are actions by means of which agent i communicates selected elements of
its local state to agent j . And likewise for the local state of the environment. Given this,
the controller may block R’s messages only on the basis of observations of the actions
performed. For this example, the behaviour of C can be modelled by giving it two local
states, ok and ok, say. We shall not model (in this paper) the possibility that the controller
C fails to act correctly, so both of its local states are green:
GC = LC = {ok,ok}, RC = ∅.
We use ok for the state where C is allowing messages from R to enter the communication
channel, and ok for the state where C has detected an attempted violation by R and is thus
blocking messages from R. The protocol of C is simply:
P ′′′C (ok) = allow, P ′′′C (ok) = block.
It remains to specify how the controller’s local state switches from ok to ok bearing in mind
that the local state of R is invisible to C. That will be done when specifying the transition
function of the system.
The protocols for S and E are the same as those we have employed so far. As for R, we
are now assuming it can develop both kinds of faults discussed in previous sections. So, in
this version of the example its local states are the following:
L′′′R = {0,1, ,0-ack,1-ack, -ack,0-f,1-f,0-ack-f,1-ack-f },
where the states {0,1, } are green as usual, and where we allow the protocol and tran-
sition functions to determine which of the remaining states are green (reachable by a
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protocol-compliant run) and which are red. As before, we will read ack as signifying that
an acknowledgement (not necessarily faulty) has been sent by R, and f that at least one
erroneous failure to send an acknowledgement by R has occurred. It is possible to devise
models with much simpler representation of R’s red local states but we will work with this
larger one as it is clearer how it combines elements from the two previous analyses.
For the protocol function for R, we want P ′′′R to be the same as PR when evaluated on
the original (green) local states LR , as usual, and to have the error-correcting behaviour
discussed in Section 6 for the local states 0-f and 1-f . For these two states, P ′′′R has the
value of P ′′R . We also want this behaviour for the local states 0-ack-f and 1-ack-f . For
the remaining states 0-ack, 1-ack, -ack, the value of P ′′′R can be chosen arbitrarily since
again nothing of interest will depend on this. For concreteness, we will follow the choice
in Section 5. So we have:
P ′′′R () = λ, P ′′′R (0) = P ′′′R (1) = sendack,
P ′′′R (0-f ) = P ′′′R (1-f ) = P ′′′R (0-ack-f ) = P ′′′R (1-ack-f ) = sendack,
P ′′′R (0-ack) = P ′′′R (1-ack) = sendack, P ′′R(-ack) = λ.
Note that while C is expected to block erroneous sendack messages when R is in the
critically faulty states (those with ack), it cannot prevent R from entering these or any
other faulty states.
We now consider the transition function of this system. In this case both global states
and joint actions are 4-tuples. Let us first consider agent C. The controller may block R’s
messages only on the basis of observations of the joint actions performed. In this example,
we get the desired effect by stipulating that C starts in state ok (blocking) and remains in
state ok until the successful transmission of a bit from S to R is observed, i.e., given our
assumptions about the communication channel, until there occurs a sendbit action by S
when the environment action is either ↔ or →. When this happens, C switches to local
state ok, and it remains in that state for the rest of the run. How do we know that this
protocol for C does indeed give the desired effect? It is precisely the point of the paper to
demonstrate how such claims can be expressed and verified formally.
It is clearer (and shorter) to define π ′′′ in terms of another function π ′′′+ which is a
combination of the effects of π ′ and π ′′ defined in earlier sections, extended to cover
the new local states for R containing both elements ack and f . π ′′′+ corresponds to the
transition function of the system without the presence of the controller agent C. We sketch
its definition presently. The definition of π ′′′ is (for all αR ∈ ActR , αS ∈ ActS , αE ∈ ActE):
π ′′′
(
(lS, lR, ok, lE), (sendbit, αR,block,−)
)
= π ′′′+
(
(lS, lR, lE), (sendbit, αR,−)
)
: ok,
π ′′′
(
(lS, lR, ok, lE), (sendbit, αR,block,←)
)
= π ′′′+ ((lS, lR, lE), (sendbit, αR,−)): ok,
π ′′′
(
(lS, lR, ok, lE), (sendbit, αR,block,→)
)
= π ′′′+
(
(lS, lR, lE), (sendbit, αR,→)
)
: ok,
π ′′′
(
(lS, lR, ok, lE), (sendbit, αR,block,↔)
)
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Table 1
λ, λ sendbit, λ sendbit, λ λ, sendack λ, sendack
ActE ← − → ↔ ← ↔ → −
(0, ) ∗ (0,0)
(0,0) (0,0-f ) (0,0-f )
(0, -ack) ∗ (0,0-ack)
(0,0-ack) (0,0-ack-f ) (0,0-ack-f )
(0,0-ack-f ) ∗ ∗
(0-ack, ) ∗ (0-ack, -ack) (0-ack, -ack)
(0-ack,0) (0-ack,0-f ) (0-ack,0-ack) (0-ack,0-ack)
(0-ack, -ack) ∗ ∗ ∗
(0-ack,0-ack) (0-ack,0-ack-f ) ∗ ∗
(0-ack,0-ack-f ) ∗ ∗ ∗
sendbit, sendack sendbit, sendack sendbit, sendack sendbit, sendack
− → ← ↔
(0, ) (0, -ack) (0,0-ack) (0-ack, -ack) (0-ack,0-ack)
(0,0) (0,0-ack) (0,0-ack) (0-ack,0-ack) (0-ack,0-ack)
(0, -ack) ∗ (0,0-ack) (0-ack, -ack) (0-ack,0-ack)
(0,0-ack) ∗ ∗ (0-ack,0-ack) (0-ack,0-ack)
(0,0-ack-f ) ∗ ∗ (0-ack,0-ack-f ) (0-ack,0-ack-f )
= π ′′′+
(
(lS, lR, lE), (sendbit, αR,→)
)
: ok,
π ′′′
(
(lS, lR, ok, lE), (αS,αR,allow, αE)
)
= π ′′′+
(
(lS, lR, lE), (αS,αR,αE)
)
: ok,
where (lS, lR, lE): lC represents the 4-tuple (lS, lR, lC, lE).
The key things to note are (1) when the controller C is blocking the transmission of
messages from the receiver, the effects of environment actions ↔ and → are those of ←
and −, respectively; and (2) a successful transmission of sendbit from the receiver (cases
3 and 4 above) switches the controller C’s local state from ok to ok.
It remains to define the function π ′′′+ . We wish to combine the effects of π ′ and π ′′
from previous sections. So, for the case where the local state lR ∈ LR and the action αR
of R belongs to PR(lR), the value of π ′′′+ is the value of π . For the case where lR ∈ L′R
and αR ∈ P ′R(lR) (which by construction subsumes the previous case of LR also) the value
of π ′′′+ is the value of π ′. And for the case where lR ∈ L′′R and αR ∈ P ′′R(lR) (which also
subsumes the first case LR) the value of π ′′′+ is the value of π ′′. The remaining cases are
those dealing with the new local states. Various concise formulations are possible but it is
perhaps clearest to present the definition here in the form of a table (with corresponding
entries for the case bit = 1) (see Table 1). The ∗ in some entries indicates that the state
remains unchanged.
We may now move to consider the deontic interpreted system
IS′′′b = (S ′′′π ,∼′′′S ,∼′′′R ,∼′′′C ,ROS ′′′,ROR ′′′,ROC ,h′′′)
generated by the system above. The set of reachable global states S ′′′π ⊂ LS ×L′′′R ×LC ×
LE can be computed from the initial states (0, , ok, ·) and (1, , ok, ·) using the transition
function π ′′′, with the green (P ′′′R -reachable) states picked out as usual. The resulting set
114 A. Lomuscio, M. Sergot / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 93–116Fig. 6. The state space of the ‘regimented’ bit-transmission system in case R may both fail to send acknowl-
edgements when supposed to, and send acknowledgements when supposed not to. Columns (respectively rows)
represent global states epistemically equivalent for S (respectively for R). The shaded entries indicate the states
that are not P ′′′
R
-reachable. The two entries struck out are those eliminated by introduction of the controller C .
of reachable global states is summarised in Fig. 6. Given that the local states of C do
not affect the epistemic states of S and R, which is our prime object of interest in this
analysis, we leave out C’s component from the table as we have done for E earlier.5 The
table also shows which global states are eliminated (made unreachable from the initial
states) by introduction of the regimentation mechanism C. Finally, we need to adjust the
interpretation function h′′′ in the obvious way so that the atom recbit is true in all global
states g except those with lR(g) =  or lR(g) = -ack.
Let us now go back to the formulas we analysed before and check whether they hold true
on IS′′′b . We should expect that the introduction of the controller C eliminates the possibility
of incorrect acknowledgements reaching S. This is indeed what we find by analysing the
formulas. It is easy to check from Fig. 6 that:
IS′′′b |= recbit →
(
KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)
)
,
IS′′′b |= recack → recbit,
from which follows, by exactly the same syntactic derivations as in Section 4:
IS′′′b |= recack →
(
KR(bit = 0)∨ KR(bit = 1)
)
,
IS′′′b |= recack → KS
(
KR(bit = 0)∨ KR(bit = 1)
)
,
IS′′′b |= recack ∧ (bit = 0) → KSKR(bit = 0).
These can also be confirmed by direct calculation from the table in Fig. 6.
Once again, it is possible to construct other formalisations of the example, for instance,
corresponding to the cases where the receiver R has no recall/memory capability. We leave
it to the reader to confirm that an analysis in the same style works also with these (simpler)
formalisations.
5 More precisely, the table represents the quotient set of the set of reachable states with respect to an equiva-
lence relation defined by (lS , lR, lC , lE) ∼ (l′S, l′R, l′C, l′E) iff lS = l′S and lR = l′R .
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8. ConclusionsWe have presented three variations of the bit-transmission problem to illustrate, and
evaluate, how the machinery of deontic interpreted systems provides a means of analysing
violations and (certain) enforcement mechanisms. Clearly the example is trivial compared
to the complex multi-agent systems applications referred to in the introductory section.
Nevertheless, it does exhibit many of the features we shall have to confront in these com-
plex examples. The fact that we have been able to carry out a detailed formal analysis
of different kinds of faults, and of the effects of enforcement and control mechanisms,
encourages us to believe that useful tools and methods can be developed on this basis.
Apart from examining further examples, we are pursuing three main lines of develop-
ment. First, we have identified a number of technical questions concerning what we called
‘conservative’ extensions of protocol functions to include red states. Generally, we can find
ways of structuring the definition of protocol functions and system transition functions to
make them easier to construct and maintain as the applications become more complex.
Space limitations prevented us from discussing alternative styles of definitions in this pa-
per. Second, we are investigating an extended formalism which colours transitions red or
green and not just states, combining the formalism of interpreted systems with the construc-
tion of a dynamic logic of permission reported in [16]. Third, and perhaps most important,
is the question of how these methods will scale up to deal with realistic examples with
many agents and many kinds of faults.
It is fortunate that in the bit transmission problem it is possible to derive the properties
of interest syntactically from very simple properties that are easy to check semantically on
the model. This will not always be the case. We do believe, however, that computational
support can be provided to enable the analysis of large, realistic problems. We have been
experimenting with model checking software for this purpose. Specifically, we use the
NuSMV temporal model checker [1] to compute the set of runs of the system. From these
we extract the set of reachable global states, and feed them into AKKA,6 a software system
for testing the validity of multi-modal formulas in a Kripke model, to verify the epistemic
properties of interest. Preliminary experiments using this method are reported in [13]. We
are also experimenting with the use of action description formalisms of the kind found in
AI to make the definition of protocol and system transition functions more concise.
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